INTRODUCTION
A court that enters an initial antitrust consent decree 1 has the inherent power to modify 2 that decree. 3 This power derives from the fact that a consent decree is an injunction, over which a court has continuing equity jurisdiction. 4 Motions requesting modifications of this decree can be made by either the defendant or the Justice Department.5 Often one party will file a motion to modify, to which the 1. An antitrust consent decree is "an order of the court agreed upon by representatives of the Attorney General . • • in proceedings instituted under the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, or related ,statutes." ANTrrRusr SUBCOMM., COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86ru CONG., lsr SESS., REPORT ON TIIE CoNSENT DECREE PROGRAM OF TIIE DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ix (Comm. Print 1959) [hereinafter cited as 1959 REPORT]. Consent decrees are attractive to antitrust defendants because § 5(a) of the Clayton Act states that a consent decree "entered before any testimony has been taken" cannot be used as evidence in a private treble damage action. 15 U.S.C. § 16 (a) (1982) . Conversely, a decree entered through litigation "shall be prima facie evidence against [the] defendant in any [private] action" against that defendant. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1982) .
The Justice Department also favors consent decrees because they allow the Department to settle a case quickly and to direct its manpower to the prosecution of the most serious antitrust violations. The Department settles a "very high percentage" of its antitrust cases through con· sent decrees. 2. Unless otherwise noted, "modification" refers to modification or termination of extant antitrust consent decrees. Some of the cases and literature use the term "modify" in reference to modification of an initial proposal for a consent decree. This Note refers to such situations as "amendments."
3. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932). 4. "We are not doubtful of the power of a court of equity to modify an injunction in adapta· tion to changed conditions though it was entered by consent.
• .
• A continuing decree of in· junction directed to events to come is subject always to adaptation as events may shape the need." United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932) ; see also System Fedn. v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 647 (1961) (''The source of the power to modify is of course the fact that an injunction often requires continuing supervision by the issuing court and always a continuing willingness to apply its powers and processes on behalf of the party who obtained that equitable relief."); Handler, Twenty-Fourth Annual Antitrust Review, 72 CoLUM. L. REV. I, 24 (1972) (The power to modify comes from the historic role of the Courts of Chancery and from the unique nature of injunctive relief itself. Traditionally, the courts have recognized that because an injunctive proceeding is "of a continuing nature," and because the power of a court of equity to enforce injunctions and to punish for their violation "continues for all time," there must also exist a correlative power to refuse to punish, and to modify or vacate injunctions .
••• (footnotes omitted)).
5. In the case of government-filed antitrust suits, the Justice Department is the acting plain· tiff. This Note will use "Justice Department" and "government" interchangeably.
other will consent. 6 On occasion, however, the nonmoving party will withhold its consent. 7 The standard for modification in contested cases is different and significantly more difficult to meet than the standard in consented-to cases. s
In 1974, Congress passed the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act 9 ("APPA" or the "Act"). The APPA requires that the government and the defendant follow certain procedures 10 before a court may consider an initial consent decree. After these procedures have been complied with, the court must make an independent public interest determination before entering the decree. I I There is some ques-6. In recent years, the Justice Department has taken an active role in modifying consent decrees. In a 1984 press release, the Department announced a desire to modify decrees that it feels "may no longer be in the public interest." United States Dept. of Justice Release at 2 (Apr. 27, 1984) . The release invited any defendants "who believe their judgments ought to be modified or terminated" to contact the division, noting that since 1981 "some 400 outstanding judgments have been reviewed for possible termination or modification." Id. at 2-3.
A Justice Department official, in an interview reported in 1981 .ANrrrRusr & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1032, at A-16 (Sept. 24, 1981) , explained the Department's position on extant consent decrees and noted that "Justice plans to look with suspicion on decrees over 10 years old. 'After 10 years, a decree is either going to work or it is not going to work.' " The official estimated that about 1,000 decrees were more than 10 years old. Id. ( 10. The Act makes the government responsible for evaluating the competitive act and notifying the public of the proposed decree. The government must then accept public comment for 60 days.
For a description of the Justice Department's current procedures, see ABA ANTrrRusr SEC-TION, ANTITRUSf CONSENT DECREE MANUAL (1979).
11. The APP A provides that: Before entering any consent judgment proposed by the United States under this section, the court shall determine that the entry of such judgment is in the public interest. For the purpose of such determination, the court may consider -(1) the competitive impact of such judgment, including termination of alleged violations, provisions for enforcement and modification, duration or relief sought, anticipated effects of alternative remedies actually considered, and any other considerations bearing upon the adequacy of such judgment;
(2) the impact of entry of such judgment upon the public generally and individuals alleg- [Vol. 84:134 tion, however, whether the Act's requirements must be followed in cases in which a modification of a consent decree is sought, 12 or whether these requirements serve merely as a guide to such modifications. This Note will attempt to determine the correct standard of review for all modifications of existing consent decrees. Part I. A. examines the current standards for modifications of consent decrees. It concludes that the APP A does not apply to such orders. Part I. B. then examines the differing standards that are currently applied to defendant-initiated modification motions without the government's consent, government-initiated modification motions without the defendant's consent, and consented-to modifications. Part II argues that these varying standards have little justification since the same substantive concerns exist in all modification cases. Part III explores the two major concerns -(1) the public interest and (2) the integrity of judicial orders -and urges courts to evaluate modification motions in light of these concerns. Part IV contends that courts making decisions under this "two-prong standard" should give deference to the government's view of the modification's propriety. The Note concludes by illustrating how courts should apply this double-barrel analysis to modification requests.
I. CURRENT JUDICIAL STANDARDS FOR MODIFICATIONS OF CONSENT DECREES
Since the passage of the APP A, 13 the standards for modifications ing specific injury from the violations set forth in the complaint including consideration of the public benefit, if any, to be derived from a determination of the issues at trial. 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (1982) .
12. See notes 13-41 infra and accompanying text.
13. Congress adopted the APP A after years of negative publicity surrounding consent de· crees. In 1959, the House antitrust subcommittee issued a report severely criticizing the Justice Department's use of consent decrees. 1959 REPORT, supra note 1. The report was largely inspired by the events surrounding United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 68,246 (D.N.J.). There, a consent decree was entered amidst accusations of collusion between the Justice Department and AT&T. The subcommittee twice requested the AT&T files, but the Attorney General refused, claiming that the files were confidential and could not, in the interests of the case, be disclosed. 1959 REPORT, supra note 1, at xi. The subcommittee, however, was not persuaded:
The extent to which the Department of Justice went to withhold information from the com· mittee in this investigation is unparalleled in the committee's experience. The Department's attitude implied that the reluctance to provide information to the committee resulted from a desire to cover up those facts which the Department considered to be embarrassing. This section argues that both the plain language and the legislative history of the APP A suggest that the Act does not apply to modifications of consent decrees. In addition, this section contends that different standards currently apply to the different types of modifications.
A. Applicability of the APPA
The only case expressly holding that the APP A does apply to modifications is United States v. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association. 18 However, the district court offered no reasons for why the APP A should apply in this case. Instead, it merely mandated, in a single sentence, that the parties comply with the Act. 19 In so doing, 30-day waiting period between government/defendant consent and judicial entry of the decree during which the public could comment on the proposed decree. See Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 2.
In 1972, Congress again became dissatisfied with the Justice Department's consent decree program. After extensive hearings -citing the same issues as were explored in the 1959 Report -Congress passed the APP A. The Act addressed Congress' primary concerns by requiring the Justice Department, before obtaining a consent decree, to: (1) issue a competitive impact statement (CIS), (2) publish notice of the proposed consent decree in the Federal Register and newspapers of general circulation, and (3) accept -for 60 days before entry -public comments. The court, in turn, is required to make a public interest determination before entering the decree. the court ignored a substantial body of cases that have utilized the APP A's public interest standard as a guide but have stopped short of holding that the actual requirements of the Act apply to modifications. 20 A series of decisions in the government's antitrust suit against AT&T (United States v. AT&T) 21 also suggests that the APPA applies to modifications. In particular, Federal District Judge Greene, the author of several of these decisions, 22 has indicated that the APP A should apply to consented-to modifications. Although Judge Greene was never required to decide whether the APP A applies to modifications because the parties before him agreed to follow the Act, his language suggests that he would require parties modifying consent decrees to comply with APP A procedures. 23 Judge Greene's opinions were, unfortunately, confused. Although the action was clearly one involving a modification of an existing decree, he did not make this clear. Indeed, Greene obscured the difference between a modification and an initial proposal. For instance, when he certified the case for direct appeal to the Supreme Court, 24 Greene stated that one of the issues presented by the case was "the extent of the power of a district court to require modifications of a Penalties Act as therein provided before the modified final judgment be presented to the court for approval. consent decree in the exercise of its jurisdiction under" the APP A. 25 However, Greene later commented that " [b ] efore the Court could approve the parties' proposed consent decree, it was required by the [APPA] . . . to determine whether the decree was 'in the public interest.' " 26 Thus, it is unclear whether Greene made the necessary distinction between initial (proposed) decrees and modifications.
Although judges in Motor Vehlcles and AT&T would apply the APP A to modifications, neither the language of the Act nor the circumstances leading to its enactment warrant such a result. Rather, the proper conclusion drawn from examining the APP A and its history is that Congress did not intend the Act to apply to modifications. 27 The most obvious argument supporting this conclusion is that the APP A does not prescribe procedures for modifications of consent decrees. 28 The Act mandates that "[a]ny proposal for a consent judgment" must be filed with the district court. 29 The Act also indicates that "[b ]efore entering any consent judgment proposed by the United States," the court must determine its impact on the public interest. 30 Nowhere in the Act, however, is there a provision governing procedures for the modification of existing decrees. Thus, two doctrines of statutory construction, the "plain meaning" rule and expressio unius est exclusio alterius ("the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another" 31 ), defeat the argument that the Act applies to modifications.
First, the plain meaning rule dictates that when the words of a statute are unambiguous, there is no room for extrastatutory interpre- [Vol. 84:134 tation. 32 The Supreme Court has indicated that "the meaning of the statutes must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, . . . the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms." 33 The language of the APP A is plain: it mandates certain procedures for consent decree proposals, but not for modifications of existing consent decrees.
A second maxim of statutory construction is that a statute that refers to enumerated items must be interpreted to exclude all items not mentioned. 34 The APPA's inclusion of only proposed consent decrees, therefore, provides strong support for the argument that the Act does not apply to modifications. 35 Thus, there are forceful arguments based solely on the language of the APP A for concluding that the Act does not apply to modifications of consent decrees.
The legislative history of the APP A lends further support to the contention that the Act does not apply to modifications. While neither the House 36 nor the Senate 37 hearings significantly discuss modifications, 38 (concentrating instead on the initial proposal and entry of consent decrees 39 ), there is evidence that Congress was aware of the distinction between modifications and initial proposals. The congressional drive to enact the APP A, for example, was based partly on a 1959 committee report that addressed consent decree modifications. 40 The fact that Congress addressed the issue of modifications 35. But see id. at 132 ("(W]here an expanded interpretation will accomplish beneficial results, serve the purpose for which the statute was enacted, is a necessary incidental to power or right, or is the established custom, usage or practice, the maxim will be disregarded and an expanded meaning given.") (footnotes omitted). 39. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 36, at 38 (The act "would require that the Justice Department file and publish, along with the consent decree, a 'public impact' statement which explains the nature and purpose of . . . the proposed consent decree ...• ") (emphasis added).
40. A discussion of the modification of consent decrees can be found in 1959 REPORT, supra note l, at 2-6. The House and Senate Hearings and the APPA were partly a result of this report. See note 13 supra.
but chose not to mention them in the Act is persuasive evidence that Congress did not intend to bring modifications under the APPA. 41 Motor Vehicle's (and perhaps AT&T's) extension of the APPA to modifications is therefore not supported by either the wording of the statute or the relevant legislative history.
B. Differing Standards
Since the APP A does not apply to modifications, the relevant inquiry is what standards do guide the courts in entering consent decree modifications. In answering this question, it is important to take account of the varying situations in which courts are asked to consider proposed modifications. Consent decree modifications most often come about in situations in which both parties consent to the changes. Occasionally, however, a court will modify a decree when one partyeither the Government or the defendant -does not consent to the modification. This subsection will survey the differing standards that courts presently apply to defendant-initiated motions without the government's consent, government-initiated motions without the defendant's consent, and proposals consented to by both parties.
Defendant-Initiated Motions Without the Government's Consent:
The Swift Doctrine
In the leading case of United States v. Swift & Co., 42 the Supreme Court recognized a court's authority to modify a consent decree. 43 In that case, the defendants -a group of meatpackers subject to a twelve-year-old consent decree -petitioned the district court to modify the decree. The court agreed to do so, despite the government's objection, and the case was appealed directly to the Supreme Court. 44 The Court established a strict standard that a defendant must meet in order to obtain a modification of an existing decree. 43. 286 U.S. at 114. The consent decree in Swift provided that ·~urisdiction of the cause was retained for the purpose of taking such other action or adding at the foot such other relief 'as may become necessary or appropriate for carrying out and enforcement' thereof, 'and for the purpose of entertaining ... any application which the parties may make' . . . . " 286 U.S. at 111-12 (quoting the consent decree issued below). But the Court stated that a district court has equity power to modify a decree whether or not the decree includes a retention of jurisdiction clause. "If the reservation had been omitted," said the court, "power there still would be by force of principles inherent in the jurisdiction of the chancery." 286 U.S. at 114.
44. Under the Expediting Act, in force at the time of Swift, antitrust cases bypassed the courts of appeals and went directly to the Supreme Court. The Act was amended when the APPA was passed. 15 U.S.C. § 29(b) (1982) now requires the district judge to certify the case for direct appeal to the Supreme Court. Otherwise the case goes to the court of appeals.
[ Cal. 1955) . In this case, the court modified a consent decree to allow defendant "reasonable" instead of merely "compensatory" return on the rental of certain equipment. The court stated the relevant standard to be whether the change is "consistent with the aims of the decree." 128 F. Supp. at 935. This statement of the standard seems wrong, and the court did not even mention Swift (1952) . Hughes involved a consent decree that required Howard Hughes either to dispose of certain stock or to deposit it with a trustee. Hughes decided to deposit the stock with a trustee. The district court, on a government motion and without a hearing, ordered Hughes to divest. The court claimed that it was merely construing the decree. The Supreme Court reversed, asserting that the "construction" was in reality a modification. In dicta, however, the court added that " [ . The APPA appears to have influenced the 1975 Swift decision. In addition to examining the public interest, the court required publication of the proposed modification, arguing that "the court is ... obligated to insure that the public . 60. Courts that ordered consented-to modifications before the APP A generally did not men- 
See generally

II. THE UNIFORM CONCERNS
As Part I of this Note demonstrates, courts have applied considerably different standards to consented-to modifications 64 than to either government-sought 6 S or defendant-souglit 66 modifications. This Part argues that there is little justification for these differing standards. First, the section compares consented-to with government-sought modifications. Second, it compares government-sought with defendant-sought modifications. Finding no differences that warrant the application of three distinct substantive standards, this Note recommends that courts focus on the same concerns in deciding whether to modify any consent decree.
A. Consented-To and Government-Sought Modifications
There is no compelling reason for drawing a distinction between consented-to and government-sought modifications. Consented-to modifications, it is true, are sought with the defendant's consent; whereas government-initiated modifications may be granted in the absence of such consent. Because of the nature of antitrust defendants, however, it can be strongly argued that the presence or absence of the defendant's consent should not be considered in deciding whether to modify a consent decree. As a general proposition, an antitrust defendant puts its own interest first and is primarily concerned with escaping judicial sanction. 67 Therefore, the defendant's consent should be factored out, and the focus should be placed on the justifications for modification proffered by the government. The government's desire for modification, after all, is the common element in consented-to and government-sought modifications. In both types of cases, it is assumed that the Justice Department is participating in order to advance the public interest. 68 If a court refuses to consider the defendant's selfinterested position, the public interest is made the paramount concern, Congress did not determine that the public interest would be best protected by the employees of the defendant, by the stockholders or creditors of the defendant, by the suppliers or customers of the defendant, by its competitors or by interest groups -all of whom have from time to time sought to intervene in consent decree proceedings. Each of these groups, after all, has a very particularized interest, an interest frequently far different from that of the public. 68. Congress determined . .
• that this crucial law enforcement role should be vested in the chief law enforcement officer of the land -appointed subject to the advice and consent of the Senate -and accountable to the President. This is recognized by the courts, which have said that it is the "United States which must alone speak for the public interest" in antitrust matters.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
[Vol. 84:134 and it becomes unnecessary to distinguish between the two types of modifications.
The argument for a more cursory examination in consented-to cases rests on the notion that a consent decree is a contract between the government and the defendant, and that parties to a contract are free to modify the provisions of an agreement between them. To be sure, a consent decree does resemble a contract. 69 The parties to the action negotiate the decree, with either party free to withdraw from negotiations and go to trial. The defendant bargains to accept the decree in exchange for the government settling the case; the government bargains to settle the case in response to the defendant's acceptance and its waiver of a right to trial. 10 When the consent decree is entered by the court, however, it becomes much more than a mere agreement. Where the parties were once free to negotiate, they are now held to the terms of the decree. 71 Thus, by entering a consent decree, a court solidifies that decree and gives it the stamp of judicial authority.
In United States v. Swift & Co., 72 the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the notion that a consent decree should be treated as a contract and not as a judicial act. 73 Demonstrating the proper respect for a judicial act, the Court declined to alter "what was decreed after years of litigation with the consent of all concerned." 74 Since a consent decree is a judicial act, rather than a contract, it should not matter whether the defendant consents to the modification. A judicial act must be treated as the edict of the court, not as an agreement subject to modification according to the desires of the original parties.
B. Government-Sought and Defendant-Sought Modifications
There is also little justification for distinguishing between contested modifications on the basis of whether they are sought by the government or the defendant. 75 he decree itself cannot be said to have a purpose; rather the parties have purposes, generally opposed to each other, and the resultant decree embodies as much of those opposing purposes as the respective parties have the bargaining power and skill to achieve.") (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). As one author points out, "it may be concluded that in such a case the only true purpose of the decree is in settlement of the government action." Handler, supra note 4, at 32 n.202.
[Vol. 84:134 In United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 91 the government sought to modify a litigated decree. In that context the Supreme Court was willing to hold that the Swift standard did not apply. United Shoe, the Court argued, was the obverse of Swift. In Swift, the defendants had "sought relief not to achieve the purposes . . . of the decree, but to escape [its] impact." 92 Since, in United Shoe, the government sought to effectuate the purposes of the decree, modification was proper. 93 United Shoe is inapposite, however, to modifications of consent decrees. A litigated decree is forced on the defendant without his or her consent, after the defendant has been found guilty. There is a record with which to find a purpose for the decree. A consent decree, however, has no purpose 94 and no record. Moreover, the defendant has exchanged his right to trial for settlement of the case. 95 A consent decree is therefore not like a litigated decree, and different standards should apply in the two contexts.
III. THE DOUBLE-BARREL STANDARD
Given that uniform concerns exist in all modification cases, it becomes necessary to define exactly what these concerns should be. This section argues that even though the APP A does not apply to modifications, its concern for the public interest is important and should be integrated into the adopted standard. On the other hand, this section contends that considering the public interest alone is insufficient. It proposes a new standard -the double-barrel standard -that considers both the public interest and the necessary respect for judicial acts. To open the floodgates for modification would be, in effect, to invite the government to make concessions in order to induce the defendant to enter a consent decree and then, subsequently, to renege on its bargain by attempting to add to the decree the very restrictions that the defendant opposed. 
A. The Desirability of a Public Interest Test
Although the APPA does not apply to modifications,9 7 some of the assumptions evident in the Act and expressed in the legislative history are relevant in evaluating modifications. One of these assumptions is that the Justice Department handles antitrust matters with an eye toward the public interest. 98 Many of the courts that have modified consent decrees9 9 after enactment of the APP A have borrowed its public interest standard. I 00 Even before the adoption of the APP A, one court held that the public interest should be considered in all modification proceedings. IOI There are problems, though, with focusing solely on the public interest. One of these problems is that a court is not in a good position to make an independent public interest determination. A court must therefore rely to a great extent on the Justice Department's conception of the public interest. Reliance on the Justice Department, however, ignores the judicial nature of consent decrees.
Court-Initiated Public Interest Determinations
Requiring a court to make a public interest determination presents a potential separation of powers problem. 102 The dissent in Maryland Our judicial system is well designed and performs well with regard to a particular function, that is, deciding controversies on an adjudicated record. I don't think the courts have any special expertise, which absent a record, enables them to second guess the Department [of Justice] •.
• and make a judgment whether a consent decree is in the public interest.
[Vol. 84:134 v. United States 103 asserted that a public interest standard "requires an evaluation of an initial policy decision -whether the benefits that might be obtained in a lawsuit are worth the risks and costs -that is clearly for non-judicial discretion." 104 Policy determinations, the dissent argued, are normally reserved for other branches of the govemment. 105 Maryland v. United States dealt with the public interest review mandated by the APPA. The APPA, however, does not apply to the modification of consent decrees. 106 It is one thing for a court to undertake a public interest determination when instructed to do so by Congress. However, in the absence of statutory authority a judicially initiated public interest review raises serious separation of powers concems. 107
Government-Controlled Public Interest Determinations
There are also problems with using a government-controlled public interest determination as the sole basis for modification. Such a standard would require the courts to defer to the Justice Department's 186, 208-37 (1962) , the Supreme Court discussed at length the notion that certain questions are "political" and thus best left to the executive and legislative branches. The Court said that "prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department . . . . " 369 U.S. at 217. The Court also listed several other factors that render a question "political" and hence nonjusticiable. Two of these are directly relevant to public interest determinations: (1) "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving [the issue];" and (2) "the impossibility of deciding without an inital policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.'' The judiciary has no special expertise in determining "the public interest" and cannot ever establish criteria to apply. It should therefore allow the political branches of government to make such determinations. assessment of what the public interest requires. 108 Though partial reliance on the Department's superior resources and expertise is desirable, complete reliance ignores the fears that led Congress to enact the APPA.
The executive branch (and by implication the Justice Department) is under a duty to assure that "the laws [of the United States] be faithfully executed." 109 It is unrealistic for a court to ignore the Justice Department's duty to protect the public interest 110 113 Members of Congress believed that courts were giving too much deference to Justice Department determinations of whether to sign consent decrees. 114 The danger that judicial deference to the government may lead to unfair modifications is partly mitigated by current Department procedures in modification cases. The Justice Department substantially complies with the APP A procedures. 115 Of course, each branch of government must give due regard to the constitutional functions of its coordinate branches. Thus, executive agencies must be highly respectful of the views of the courts, the interpretative body in government. But the judiciary must also carefully consider the executive branch's views. The courts must remember that, unlike private litigants, the executive branch is obligated to use its prosecutorial discretion to bring only cases that promote the public interest • • . . When the executive branch brings a case, it represents not only its belief that the courts should examine the challenged conduct for possible illegality, but also that the rules oflaw it seeks to apply are in the public interest both for the instant case and for subsequent prosecutions.
(emphasis in original).
111. 115. See note 27 supra.
[Vol. 84:134 continues this policy, the fears that led to the enactment of the APPA are allayed. But since the APPA does not apply 116 the Department is free to disregard its current policy. There is a need, then, for some judicial review to act as a check on the Department's practices.
B. Respect for a Judicial Act
Though it is necessary to take account of the public interest before modifying a consent decree, 117 considering only the public interest ignores the judicial nature of consent decrees. A consent decree is a judicial act, 1 18 and a court should modify it only if the modification will respect the judicial nature of the decree. 119 This is so regardless of whether the modification serves the public interest.120 "Respect for a judicial act" is not mere verbiage or rhetoric. In order to preserve respect for its prior orders, a court should modify a decree only if the decree is operating inequitably. This proposition accords with the concerns enunciated in Swift. 121 Hardship to the parties is the most important element, 122 and a court should be most sensitive to it. No modification should be granted without a showing of hardship.
IV. APPLYING THE DOUBLE-BARREL STANDARD
As illustrated in the previous sections, courts should consider the same factors in all modification cases. They should, borrowing from Swift, show respect for consent decrees as judicial acts, 123 and at the same time consider the public interest, as suggested by the APP A. 124 These concerns place initial responsibility for determining the public interest on the government, but make the courts ultimately responsible The fact that the court may consider the opinion of the Department of Justice to the same effect [that the decree is in the public interest] does not mean that the court has abdicated its power, or failed to carry out its responsibility, to make an independent determination of the propriety and equity of the decree proposed by the parties.
121. Swift, 286 U.S. at 119. See notes 42-47 supra and accompanying text. 122. Although Swift discussed changed circumstances and unforeseeability, it is clear that the Court looked more toward hardship. "No doubt the defendants will be better off if the injunction is relaxed, but they are not suffering hardship so extreme and unexpected as to justify us in saying that they are the victims of oppression." Swift, 286 U.S. at 119.
123. See notes 72-74 supra and accompanying text. 124. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
for ensuring respect for judicial acts. The focus is uniform and should be applied to all types of consent decree modifications. 125 The previous section sets out the substantive issues courts should examine in deciding whether to modify consent decrees. Though they present uniform concerns, consented-to, government-sought, and defendant-sought modifications should not necessarily receive identical treatment from the courts. Indeed, the Justice Department's position concerning the propriety of modification should be critical in determining whether modification is granted. After all, the antitrust division of the Justice Department is charged with protecting the public interest. 126 Since the double-barrel standard requires courts to consider whether a modification is in the public interest, courts should give presumptive weight to the government's view on this issue. 127 The defendant, on the other hand, is only concerned with its own profitability, and thus its position as to the propriety of the modification should not be accorded any deference. 128 Therefore, while courts should examine the same factors in all modification cases, the presumptions should vary depending on whether the Justice Department supports the motion.
Under the double-barrel standard, then, the Justice Department's action will create a rebuttable presumption that the modification is or is not in the public interest. The court, in tum, will look to the continuing equity of the decree. Below is an analysis of how the standard would work with regard to the different types of modifications:
Consented-To Modifications.
(1) The Justice Department's consent will establish a presumption that the modifications are in the public interest. Since the defendant in consented-to cases will not attempt to rebut this presumption, the court should be willing to hear the views of third parties. (2) The Department and/or the defendant must show hardship. The Department would show hardship to the public. The defendant would show hardship to itself.
Government-Sought, Without Defendant's Consent.
(1) The Department's action will again establish a presumption that the modification is in the public interest, which the defendant (and third parties) will be free to rebut. (2) The Department must also show hardship.
Defendant-Sought, Without the Government's Consent.
(1) The Justice Department's lack of consent will create a presumption that the modification would not be in the public interest. The defendant 128. See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 84:134 has the burden of showing otherwise. (2) The defendant must also establish hardship. From the foregoing, it is clear that consented-to modifications will be easiest to obtain; government-sought less easy; and defendantsought, relatively difficult. This accords with what courts have been doing under the guise of different standards. 12 9 However, while suggesting presumptions identifying uniform concerns may not lead to different results, it does serve the salutary purpose of describing how courts should decide whether to grant any type of consent decree modification.
CONCLUSION
The Justice Department and the courts seem to be at odds regarding the correct standard for granting modifications of antitrust consent decrees. This Note has proposed a new standard-the double-barrel standard-to guide courts in deciding whether to modify an existing decree. Under this standard, a court should modify a decree only if the modification advances the public interest and demonstrates respect for a prior judicial act.
-John D. Anderson 
